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INTRODUCTION
Employees in the meat and poultry processing industry work under
some of the most dangerous working conditions in the nation, yet they
are undercompensated.1 The following excerpt demonstrates one task for
which employees are commonly uncompensated entirely: the “donning
and doffing” of safety equipment.2
I would get my old stuff out, put my rubber boots on, and then you
go form a line where they hand out your supplies and there’s somebody
right there that’ll hand you a red smock or white smock depending on the
department that you’re in, and then you step to the window and she
hands you your plastic—the blue gloves, the plastic apron, a pair of ear
plugs, and a hair net. Or a cutting glove; you need to show a cuttin’
glove to get a cuttin’ glove. It took 30 to 45 minutes a day just gettin’
ready to, ya know, the process of getting ready and finishin’ work. You
can’t walk outta there with blood up to your elbows, I’m not driving
home like that.
And you don’t get paid for that?
No.3
For years, courts have grappled with which activities at the
beginning and end of the workday should be compensated. Enacted in
1 See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2003); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-96, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: SAFETY IN THE
MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY, WHILE IMPROVING, COULD BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED
7, 18, 21, 27 (2005) [hereinafter WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH] (citing a 14.9% injury
and illness rate in 2002 as compared to 7.2% for all of U.S. manufacturing from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is based on employer self-reporting); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY
PLANTS (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usa0105/2.htm#_ftnref20
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH]; WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33002, LABOR PRACTICES IN THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW, 43–
47 (2005).
2 Hereinafter, the phrase “donning and doffing” refers to the putting on and taking
off of safety equipment. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 369, 371
(11th ed. 2008) (defining “doff” as “1 a : to remove (an article of wear) from the body b
: to take off (the hat) in greeting or as a sign of respect 2 : to rid oneself of : put aside . . .
.”; defining “don” as “1 : to put on (an article of clothing) 2 : to wrap oneself in . . . .”);
The Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/doff-your-hat.html (last visited
June 17, 2012) (noting that “don” and “doff” are contractions of “do on” and “do off”
that originated in Northern England in the fifteenth century and have come to mean the
putting on and taking off of clothing items or even personas or ideas; doffing was also
associated with temporarily removing a hat or cap as a sign of respect).
3 DONALD D. STULL & MICHAEL J. BROADWAY, SLAUGHTERHOUSE BLUES: THE
MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY IN NORTH AMERICA 77 (John A. Young ed., Wadsworth
2004).
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1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) prescribes a minimum
wage per hour of work and overtime pay for workweeks in excess of
forty hours.4 Ten years after the FLSA was enacted, in reaction to
judicial interpretations that increased their liability under the statute,
employers lobbied Congress to enact the Portal to Portal Act (“PPA”) to
amend the FLSA.5 The PPA excludes certain types of activities
performed at the start and end of the workday from remuneration.6 Just
two years later, employers successfully lobbied for another amendment
to the FLSA, which further limited their liability.7 This second
amendment, Section 203(o), allowed employers and union
representatives to bargain with respect to the time employees spend
changing clothes and washing at the beginning and end of the workday. 8
In light of the considerable amount of time employees spend
donning and doffing safety equipment at the beginning and end of each
workday, the PPA and Section 203(o) are at the heart of wage and hour
litigation in the meat and poultry processing industry. Regardless of
whether employees work with large animals, such as cattle, sheep, or
hogs, or with smaller animals, such as turkeys or chickens, the
slaughtering and packing process entails regular contact with hazardous
material such as blood, feces, intestinal juices, and poisonous chemicals
necessitating sanitization.9 The process also requires the operation of
hazardous tools and machinery to kill and dismantle animals, and further
unsafe working conditions are created by continuous, repetitive motions
of cutting in cramped workspaces at unsafe speeds.10 Therefore,
4

29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974); 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2007, 2010).
Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1256 (2009).
6 See 29 U.S.C. § 254 (1996); IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); Dorris,
supra note 5, at 1256 (noting that other noteworthy changes to the FLSA were a two year
statute of limitations, which became three if the violation was in bad faith, 29 U.S.C. §
255; the elimination of liquidated damages except for violations made in bad faith, 29
U.S.C.A. § 260; and required opt-in for class action suits, 29 USC § 216(b).).
7 Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 958 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 95 CONG.
REC. 11,433 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (comments of Rep. Herter)).
8 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006). Section 203(o) is within the “Definitions” section of
the FLSA and provides:
(o) Hours Worked.—In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title
the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was
excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of
or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to
the particular employee. Id.
9 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 44–45; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note
1, at 20.
10 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 19–24; WHITTAKER, supra note
1, at 44 (describing health and safety concerns such as “workers ‘stationed so close
5
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employees must wear protective gear, which varies in weight and
complexity, according to the task.11 The more complicated the protective
gear, the more time required to prepare for work, breaks, and cleaning.12
To maximize profits in a competitive marketplace, employers
typically utilize a “gang time” pay model and pay employees only for
time spent on the production line actually processing meat or poultry.13
Employees may spend as much as an hour each day donning and doffing
safety equipment, yet are frequently not paid for this time.14 Since
employers do not include the time spent donning and doffing as part of a
forty-hour workweek, courts that have considered the issue, in some
instances, have held such time to constitute overtime, requiring overtime
pay. But claims made on behalf of hundreds of employees can span
several years and total millions of dollars in lost wages for workers and,
conversely, liability for employers.15
The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted Section 203(o). Thus,
circuits are split over what is covered by the provision, and only one
circuit has ruled on whether it preempts more protective state laws.16
Further, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has changed its
position on the issue multiple times over the past fifteen years.17 The
disagreement among the circuits primarily concerns the meaning of
“clothing”—specifically, whether the various pieces of safety gear that
employees are required to wear constitute clothing within the meaning of
the statute.18 Employees argue that the term “clothing” does not include
safety gear that is required to be worn by law, employers, or the nature of
the work, and, therefore, parties are prohibited from bargaining over time

together they lacerated coworkers with their knives, indicating a need for more space,
more protective gear, or both.’”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 33; NEBRASKA
APPLESEED, THE SPEED KILLS YOU: THE VOICE OF NEBRASKA’S MEATPACKING WORKERS
27
(Oct.
2009)
[hereinafter
NEBRASKA
APPLESEED],
available
at
http://www.boldnebraska.org/uploaded/pdf/the_speed_kills_you_030910.pdf.
11 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 44–45; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note
1, at 25.
12 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 44–45.
13 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 899–900; Perez v. Mountaire Farms Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 360
(4th Cir. 2011); CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., WORK WITHOUT
JUSTICE: LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT LABORERS 22 (2000) [hereinafter WORK WITHOUT
JUSTICE], available at http://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/atrisk3.pdf.
14 STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 3, at 77; Perez, 650 F.3d at 372; De Ascencio v.
Tyson Food, Inc., 500 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007); but see Townsend v. BC Natural Chicken
LLC, No. 06-4317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2007) (union
employees bargained to be paid for a portion of the time spent donning and doffing).
15 See infra notes 33–41 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 146–50, 178–82 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 132–145 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
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spent donning and doffing.19 In contrast, employers argue that clothing
includes all safety gear that employees don and doff at the beginning and
end of each workday, permitting parties to bargain over this time.20
Furthermore, employees argue that Section 203(o) and the Labor
Relations Management Act (“LMRA”) do not preempt state laws
requiring payment for donning and doffing, whereas employers argue
that Section 203(o) and the LMRA preempt state law.21
This article presents two arguments. First, Section 203(o) should
be interpreted narrowly to exclude “required safety gear” in fairness to
workers.22 The exploitative work conditions present in the meat and
poultry processing industry demand more protective laws.23
Compensating workers for time spent donning and doffing safety gear
required to perform their work is consistent with the purpose of the
FLSA, which is to combat exploitative working conditions through a
minimum standard of living.24 Section 203(o) will not be rendered
meaningless by preventing collective bargaining over the time spent
donning and doffing required safety gear because time spent donning and
doffing regular clothing can still be part of a collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”).25
Allowing CBAs to exclude time spent donning and doffing
required safety gear runs counter to the purpose of FLSA. When it
excluded particular activities from compensation under the PPA,
Congress wanted to ensure that the definition of work was not otherwise
altered and, therefore, declared that the PPA should be construed
liberally to encompass all work regardless of contract, custom, or
practice.26 In interpreting the PPA, the Supreme Court has found that
activities such as the donning and doffing of required safety gear are

19

Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894.
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 527 F. Supp.2d 860 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (employer did
not dispute the time was work but argued it was excluded under Section 203(o) because
safety gear constituted clothing).
21 See Anna Wermuth & Jeremy Glenn, It’s No Revolution: Long Standing Legal
Principles Mandate the Preemption of State Laws in Conflict with Section 3(o) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 839 (2010).
22 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970) (noting that safety gear should be excluded if
“required by law, by rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work,” but not gear
worn primarily for the employee’s convenience.).
23 See infra Part II.
24 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974) (describing the congressional finding and declaration of
policy of the FLSA).
25 Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (police officer
uniforms); Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 2008) (postal worker
uniform); 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) (1970).
26 See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
20
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work that must be compensated.27 Furthermore, because Section 203(o)
is an FLSA exemption, it commands a narrow interpretation. Safety gear
does not plainly and unmistakably fit within the clothing exemption.
Secondly, this article argues that both Section 203(o) and the
LMRA should not preempt more protective state laws. Apart from
whether required safety gear is found to constitute “clothing” under
Section 203(o), states should be permitted to promulgate more protective
legislation. The FLSA’s “Savings Clause” expressly permits states to set
a higher minimum wage and shorter maximum workweek.28
Compensating employees for time spent donning and doffing safety gear
shortens the workweek and falls within the Savings Clause.
The LMRA, which governs preemption, yields to the FLSA’s
provisions on the minimum wage and maximum workweek, prohibiting
employers and union representatives from bargaining for payment below
the minimum wage or for a workweek longer than the maximum set by
federal or state law.29 Activities not covered under the PPA, such as time
spent donning and doffing required safety gear, contribute to the
maximum workweek.30 Since the LMRA yields to laws setting a shorter
workweek, the LMRA should not preempt state laws providing for
shorter workweeks by requiring payment of time spent donning and
doffing.
This article will proceed as follows. Part II summarizes the
conditions employees face in the meat and poultry processing industry,
all of which evidence the need for more protective labor laws and greater
enforcement. Part III establishes a background of the relevant law,
providing a review of the FLSA, the PPA, Section 203(o), and
corresponding case law. It also evaluates the preemption of state law
with respect to Section 203(o) and the LMRA. Part IV then provides an
analysis, arguing that the PPA, other laws, and canons of interpretation
support the exclusion of time spent donning and doffing required safety
gear within Section 203(o) and thus preclude the bargaining of this time.
Apart from whether time spent donning and doffing required safety gear
is precluded from Section 203(o), Part IV argues that the FLSA’s
Savings Clause prevents more protective state laws from being
preempted by Section 203(o).31 Finally, Part IV argues that since the

27 29 U.S.C. § 254 (1996); IBP, Inc.v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); Steiner v.
Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956).
28 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1967).
29 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740–41 (1981);
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 2010).
30 29 U.S.C. § 254 (d) (1996).
31 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1967).
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time spent donning and doffing required safety gear counts toward the
maximum workweek,32 the LMRA should not preempt state laws
requiring a shorter workweek.
WORK CONDITIONS IN THE MEAT AND POULTRY PROCESSING INDUSTRY
Over the past ten years, there have been numerous books, reports,
and films documenting a number of serious issues within the United
States meat and poultry processing industry, including lethal food
contamination, extraordinarily high injury and death rates for workers,
meager salaries, inadequate compensation for work injuries, and the
negative economic and environmental impact on communities where
factories are located. 33 Despite these numerous reports detailing the
dangers and abuses within the industry, workers continue to struggle for
safe working conditions and decent pay.34 Although several legislative
regimes are available to protect employees from violations of safety,
labor, and other laws, there is widespread under-enforcement, especially
when it comes to the most vulnerable and lowest wage earners.35 Even
32 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2010) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no
employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess.”).
33 See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN
MEAL 149–223 (Harper Perennial 2005) (2001); FAST FOOD NATION (20th Century Fox
2007); FOOD, INC. (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 1; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1; WHITTAKER, supra note 1;
NEBRASKA APPLESEED, supra note 10; STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 3; A RIVER OF
WASTE: THE HAZARDOUS TRUTH ABOUT FACTORY FARMS (Cinema Libre 2009);
JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, EATING ANIMALS (Hachette Book Grp., Inc. 2009); WORK
WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 13; Charlotte S. Alexander, The Law and Economics of
Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
(forthcoming 2012).
34 See sources cited supra note 33.
35 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 43–44 (referring to the DOL survey conducted in
1997-1998, “Violations of the FLSA and of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Protection Act were found to be systemic. Some 60% of surveyed plants ‘had
violations of wage and hour and safety and health laws.’”); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
POULTRY PROCESSING COMPLIANCE SURVEY FACT SHEET (2001), available at
http://www.ufcw.org/docUploads/Usdept~1.pdf?CFID=7005606&CFTOKEN=63042914
(finding wage and hour violations in 100% of the 51 companies inspected, 65% were
misclassifying workers as exempt from FLSA coverage, 0% were in compliance with
three major labor statutes,); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department
Resolves Back Wage Case Against Pittsburg, Texas-Based Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. (Jan.
29, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/whd20100073.htm;
Brady & Associates, Tyson Pays $32 Million to Settle Donning and Doffing Lawsuit,
KANSAS
CITY
EMPLOYMENT
LAWYER
BLOG
(Sept.
22,
2011),
http://www.kansascityemploymentlawyerblog.com; J.C. Solomon, Jury Awards $2
Million Verdict to Meat Processing Facility Employees, WAGE & HOUR LAW BLOG (Sept.
27, 2011), http://wageandhour.yezbaklaw.com; Cam Caldwell, Tyson Foods Workers
Awarded Jury Verdict in FLSA Lawsuit, WAGE & HOUR LAW BLOG (Mar. 18, 2011),
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when employees manage to complain or unionize, under-protective and
unpredictable laws do not provide meaningful solutions to correct the
detrimental work conditions the FLSA was meant to address.36
A prevalent problem within the meat and poultry processing
industry is the systemic lack of enforcement of wage and hour laws.37
Nationwide, it has been estimated that employers pay more than one
billion dollars annually to litigate wage and hour cases.38 Wage and hour
class action suits are the most common type of class action, account for
almost 20% of all class actions.39 The meat and poultry industry is
responsible for a large share of these violations, which have persisted for
many years. Out of fifty-one poultry companies surveyed in 2000, the
DOL found that 100% had wage and hour violations.40 Wage and hour
violations continue to plague the industry as evidenced by recent wage
and hour lawsuits on behalf of poultry and meat processing workers at
Tyson Foods, Inc. and Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.41
At one time, a job in the meatpacking industry was desirable
because of gains made by strong union membership.42
Union
membership in the meat processing industry was roughly 50% between
1970 and 1980; however, by 1987, that percentage had declined to
21%.43 Since then, union membership has remained around 20% for
http://wageandhour.yezbaklaw.com/2011/09/articles/meat-and-poultry-workers/juryawards-2-million-verdict-to-meat-processing-facility-employees/.
36 See sources cited supra note 35; Benjamin, I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making
Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1162–64 (2011); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 3–5; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at
7; WORK WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 26; WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 7;
Alexander, supra note 33.
37 See sources cited supra notes 33 and 35.
38 See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009), available at
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1; Shannon
Green, Wage and Hour Litigation is Big—and Getting Bigger, N.J. LAW JOURNAL, Mar.
19,
2012,
available
at,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nj/PubArticleNJ.jsp?id=1202546026856&slreturn=1;
Dorris
supra note 5, at 1255 (“The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
recovered over $ 185 million in unpaid wages for more than 228,000 employees in fiscal
year 2008. This is just a small percentage of the probable number of FLSA violations.
Private actions likely recovered many times more unpaid wages during the same time
period. One report suggests private plaintiffs recover over $ 1 billion annually.”);
Michael Orey, Wage Wars, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_40/b4052001.htm.
39 Dorris supra note 5, at 1251.
40 See sources cited supra note 35; WORK WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 12, 22.
41 See sources cited supra note 35.
42 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 7; WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at
7; SCHLOSSER, supra note 33, at 149; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 11–16.
43 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 7.
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both poultry and meat workers, yet it still exceeds the average rate of
This decline in union
union membership nationwide: 12%.44
membership has coincided with the restructuring and consolidation of the
industry (including relocation to union-free environments), a significant
decrease in salaries, an increase in immigrant workers, and a large
increase in employee turnover rate.45 Thus, while union membership in
the meat and poultry industry is greater than the national average,
members constitute only approximately 20% of the workforce and face
multiple challenges in increasing their numbers to improve the abusive
work conditions facing both nonunion and union employees.
Although in many circumstances unions provide members with
better work conditions than their nonunion counterparts, all employees
still require baseline protection. Within the meat and poultry processing
industry, two barriers prevent unions from making meaningful
improvements. First, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),
which governs unions, is under-protective and does not permit
employees to effectively organize to protect their rights and improve
working conditions.46 Second, fierce competition within the industry
encourages employers to preserve abusive work practices in order to

44 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010–11 LIBRARY EDITION, BULLETIN 2800, at 730 (U.S. Gov’t
Printing Office 2010–11 ed. 2010) (citing 16% union coverage for food processing
employees in 2008); Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND
COVERAGE DATABASE FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS),
http://unionstats.gsu.edu (last updated Feb. 4, 2012) (listing 20.3% union coverage for
employees in the Animal Slaughtering and Processing Industry category (CIC 1180) and
23.3% union coverage for employees in the Butchers and Meat, Fish, and Poultry
Processing Occupation category (COC 7810)); Tony Horwitz, 9 To Nowhere—These Six
Growth Jobs Are Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes Dangerous, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at
A6 (“Roughly 80% [of poultry workers] are nonunion . . . .”); Press Release, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members Summary–2011 (Jan. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (citing 11.8% average for
all union members, 37.0% for public sector, and 6.9% for private sector employees).
45 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 7, 18; WHITTAKER, supra note
1, at 25; STULL & BROADWAY, supra note 3, at 73–75; Alexander supra note 33; Bureau
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, May 2011 National Industry-Specific
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: NAICS 311600 - Animal Slaughtering
and
Processing,
OCCUPATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT
STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_311600.htm (last modified Mar. 27, 2012) (listing
annual mean wages of $23,610 for meat, poultry, and fish cutters and trimmers; $24,300
for slaughterers and packers; and $27,410 for butchers and meat cutters in the animal
slaughtering industry); David Moberg, Poultry Giants Fight Organizers, IN THESE TIMES,
Jan.
30,
2004,
available
at
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/689/poultry_giants_fight_organizers (noting that
poultry workers make an average of $8 per hour).
46 Sachs, supra note 36, at 1162–64.
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Therefore, stronger federal legislation and
remain profitable.47
enforcement are required to ensure baseline protections, such as
minimum wage and overtime pay, for union employees.48
The labor law regime poses a formidable challenge to increasing
union membership and strength, thus improving work conditions. For
years, U.S. labor law has been criticized as being ineffectual, and
collective action has been described as “moribund.”49 Indeed, the NLRA
has faced criticism over the same central issues, but repeated attempts at
reform have failed.50 As an initial matter, the NLRA’s protection
excludes many categories of employees.51 Under the NLRA, employers
can easily interfere with employee organization, as unions lack the rights
necessary to communicate with employees.52 Furthermore, the remedial
framework of the NLRA is too weak to protect employees against
retaliation from employers.53 The election process, for instance, is too
slow, allowing employers to defeat unions through attrition and delay.54
Finally, the NLRA’s “good faith” bargaining obligation is meaningless
because the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) cannot impose
contract terms as a remedy.55
Although the NLRA granted workers the right to organize and
bargain collectively in order to improve their working conditions, the
FLSA’s purpose is to provide a “minimum standard of living necessary
for health, efficiency, and general well-being” (through a minimum wage
and maximum workweek)to address detrimental working conditions of
workers.56 When legislative hearings on the proposal of the FLSA were
held, Sydney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union, urged that the only way to raise standards uniformly was to have
it done by the government.57 Forcing high standards on only a few
employers at a time would drive those employers out of business before
the rest of the industry could effectively be organized.58
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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
49 Sachs, supra note 36, at 1162.
50 Id. at 1163–64.
51 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1978) (defining “employee”).
52 Sachs, supra note 36, at 1162.
53 Id. at 1162.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1162–63.
56 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974) (congressional finding and
declaration of policy).
57 John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 468 (1939).
58 Id. at 468.
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With union membership currently at approximately 20%, dramatic
improvements with respect to wages or other work conditions are limited
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”), which
for union members.59
investigates and exposes human rights violations around the world,
documented numerous violations by meat and poultry processing
employers in a 185-page report entitled, “Blood, Sweat, and Fear:
Workers’ Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry Plants.”60 In its report, HRW
calls upon the U.S. government to pass uniform legislation to strengthen
minimum labor standards, arguing that if only one company attempted to
improve workplace conditions, it likely would go bankrupt, as
competitive companies would not follow suit.61 “Only governmental
power can set a uniform floor of strengthened industry-wide rules” and
“provide the strong legal enforcement required to deter employers from
violating workers’ rights.”62
BACKGROUND OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. Fair Labor Standards Act
President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged Congress to pass the FLSA
to give workers “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”63 The President
asserted the necessity for regulation of “maximum hours, minimum
wages, the evil of child labor and the exploitation of unorganized
labor.”64 The FLSA was enacted in 1938 to address the “existence . . . of
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard
of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers.”65 These conditions, among other things, cause commerce “to
be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions,” constitute “an
unfair method of competition,” lead to labor disputes, and interfere “with
the orderly and fair marketing of goods.”66 Thus, the primary purpose of
the FLSA is to address employees’ living and working conditions,67

59

See Moberg, supra note 45.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1.
61 Id. at 2.
62 Id.
63 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1253 (from public papers and addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt: the constitution prevails); see also Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488
F.3d 586, 589 (2d Cir. 2007).
64 Forsythe, supra note 57, at 465–66.
65 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1974) (congressional finding and declaration of policy).
66 Id.
67 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1253; Forsythe, supra note 57, at 465–66.
60

2012]

And You Don’t Get Paid for That

47

requiring employers to pay minimum wages and overtime.68 Congress
declared that the FLSA was to be used “to correct and as rapidly as
possible . . . eliminate these conditions without substantially curtailing
employment or earning power,” and the Act has since been liberally
interpreted.69
B. The Portal to Portal Act
In 1947, almost ten years after the passage of the FLSA, the PPA
was enacted in response to lobbying efforts from employers to limit their
FLSA liabilities.70 Several United States Supreme Court decisions
prompted numerous lawsuits and subsequent lobbying for the passage of
the PPA.71 “The primary concern was the many pending ‘portal-toportal’ suits—actions brought on the theory that travel time and other
preliminary and postliminary work activities should be compensated.
Nearly two thousand such suits had been filed in a six-month time span,
resulting in well over $ 6 billion (in 1947 dollars) of estimated
liability.”72
An example of one such case is Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co. There, employees were required to first punch a time clock and then
walk to their respective work benches where they performed preliminary
duties before beginning productive work.73 Employees were docked
fourteen minutes for this activity at both the beginning and end of the
workday, and at the start and end of lunchtime, which resulted in a fiftysix-minute deduction from wages each day.74 The Supreme Court held
that time spent walking from a time clock at the entrance of the factory to
a workstation was part of the statutory workweek and must be
compensated.75 The Court reasoned that an employer must compensate
its employees for time it requires them to be on its work premises, on
duty, or at a workplace prior and subsequent to the employees’ scheduled
68 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-7 (2007) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees . .
. wages . . . not less than . . . $7.25 an hour.”); 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 (2010) (“[N]o employer
shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above
specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.”)
69 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1974); IBP, Inc.v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 25 (2005).
70 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256.
71 See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590
(1944); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161
(1945); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
72 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256.
73 Anderson, 328 U.S. at 689–90.
74 Id. at 682–85.
75 Id. at 690–91.
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working hours.76 In reaching this conclusion, the Court followed its
recent decisions, including Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, where it held that time spent traveling from iron
ore mine portals to underground work areas was compensable.77
In enacting the PPA, Congress found that the FLSA had been
judicially interpreted “in disregard of long-established customs,
practices, and contracts between employers and employees.”78 Congress
was concerned that this unexpected liability would result in financial ruin
for employers.79 The PPA, therefore, excluded from FLSA coverage
time employees spend “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the
actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which
such employee is employed to perform, and activities which are
preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.”80
Congress was careful to ensure, however, that only activities
specifically detailed under the PPA were excluded from the FLSA’s
protection. In discussing the PPA, Senator Cooper explained which
actions were covered: “[T]he liberal construction of the terms ‘principal
activity or activities’ urged by Congress, the President, and the Secretary
of Labor . . . [provide] broad coverage under the F.L.S.A. and
limit[]application of the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exemptions . . . to those
employee activities ‘which in no way enter into the production of
goods.’”81 Furthermore, upon approving the PPA, the President stated
the following to Congress:
[T]he legislative history of the Act shows that Congress intends that
the words “principal activities” are to be construed liberally to include
any work of consequence performed for the employer, no matter when
76

Id. at 691.
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598
(1944) (defining work as physical or mental exertion controlled or required by the
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business); Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 131 (1944) (noting that exertion is
not necessary for an activity to constitute work under the FLSA and that an employer
may hire a man to do nothing or to wait for something to happen).
78 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1947). But see Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 741 (1981)
(“The Fair Labor Standards Act was not designed to codify or perpetuate [industry]
customs and contracts . . . . Congress intended, instead, to achieve a uniform national
policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged in by
employees covered by the Act. Any custom or contract falling short of that basic policy,
like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to
deprive employees of their statutory rights.”).
79 Id.; see also Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256.
80 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)–(2) (1996).
81 Dunlop v. City Electric, 527 F.2d 394, 399 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added)
(quoting comments of Senator Cooper during floor debates on the Portal-to-Portal Act).
77
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the work is performed. We should not lose sight of the important
requirement under the Act that all “principal activities” must be paid for,
regardless of contract, custom, or practice. I am sure the courts will not
permit employers to use artificial devices such as the shifting of work to
the beginning or the end of the day to avoid liability under the law.82
1. DOL Regulations Interpreting the PPA
Soon after the PPA was enacted, the Secretary of Labor issued an
interpretive bulletin discussing the Act.83 Although administrative
regulations are not given final authority until courts review them,
Congress showed its support for the interpretation put forward by the
Secretary of Labor by enacting Section 16(c) shortly thereafter. 84
Section 16(c) strengthened the force of the Secretary of Labor’s
interpretation by providing “any order, regulation, or interpretation . . .
shall remain in effect . . . except to the extent that any such order,
regulation, interpretation, or agreement may be inconsistent with the
provisions of [the FLSA].”85
Although not explicitly addressed in the statute, Congress
effectively overturned Anderson and Tennessee Coal. The Secretary of
Labor stated that time spent “traveling between the portal of the mine
and the working face at the beginning and end of each workday” would
not be compensated in the absence of a contract, custom, or practice.86
The PPA provides that employers must pay employees where there is “an
express provision of a . . . contract” or a “custom or practice” of
compensating activities that would otherwise be excluded under the
PPA.87
The PPA did not otherwise change the purpose of the FLSA or its
definition of work.88 It did not affect the computation of hours within a
82 Id. at 398–99 & n.6 (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1996); 29
C.F.R. § 790.8(b)(2) (1970) (“Such preparatory activities, which the Administrator has
always regarded as work and as compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, remain
so under the Portal Act, regardless of contrary custom or contract.”).
83 29 C.F.R. § 790.1 (1970) (Introductory Statement).
84 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956); 29 C.F.R. § 790.1(c) (1970); Brief
for Respondents at 21 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (No. 03-1238).
85 Steiner, 350 U.S. at 255 & n.8.
86 29 C.F.R. § 790.5(b)(1)–(2) (1970) (explaining effect of Portal-to-Portal Act on
determination of hours worked).
87 29 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1996).
88 IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 28; 29 C.F.R. § 790.2 (1970) (“[T]he act makes no express
change in the national policy, declared by Congress in section 2 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, of eliminating labor conditions ‘detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers.’ The legislative history indicates that the Portal Act was not intended to change
this general policy.”).
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workday, that is, the period between the commencement and conclusion
of the principal work activities.89 The Secretary of Labor explained that
“[p]reparatory activities, which the Administrator has always regarded as
work and as compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, remain so
under the Portal Act, regardless of contrary custom or contract.”90
2. The PPA Case Law
i. United States Supreme Court Law on the PPA
Eight years after the PPA was enacted, the United States Supreme
Court, in Steiner v. Mitchell, concluded that principal activities comprise
all activities which are “an integral and indispensable part of the
principal activities,” including the donning and doffing of protective gear
“before or after the regular work shift, on or off the production line.”91
Steiner involved a battery manufacturing plant where all production
workers were exposed to corrosive and toxic chemicals.92 Workers were
required to shower and change their clothes at the plant in order to
protect their health and the health of their families.93 This practice was
part of an industrial hygiene program, and Tennessee state law required
the employer to provide facilities for showering and changing clothes.94
In reaching its decision, the Court referred to a colloquy that took place
during Senate hearings on the PPA, in which Senator Cooper had stated,
“[I]f the employee could not perform his activity without putting on
certain clothes, then the time used in changing into those clothes would
be compensable as part of his principal activity.”95
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, another significant Supreme Court decision,
was a consolidation of two federal appellate cases involving employers
in the meat and poultry processing industry.96 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.
89

IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 28; 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a)–(b) (1970).
29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a) (1970) (noting that an employee operating a lathe “will
frequently at the commencement of his workday oil, grease or clean his machine, or
install a new cutting tool,” and that “a garment worker in a textile mill, who is required to
report 30 minutes before other employees report to commence their principal activities,”
will “during such 30 minutes distribute[] clothing or parts of clothing at the workbenches
of other employees and get[] machines” ready for use by other employees); 29 C.F.R. §
790.7(a) (1970) (noting that “the criteria described in the Portal Act have no bearing on
the compensability or the status as worktime under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
activities that are not ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activities outside the workday.”).
91 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956).
92 Id. at 249.
93 Id. at 251.
94 Id. at 250.
95 Id. at 258 (citation omitted).
96 IBP, Inc.v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 24 (2005).
90
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involved a slaughter and processing plant belonging to the largest meat
processor in the United States, at which all production workers were
required to wear numerous articles of protective gear.97 The Ninth
Circuit in Alvarez held that the donning and doffing of protective gear
was integral and indispensible.98 It also held that time spent donning and
doffing protective gear that was unique to the job at issue was
compensable, but that time employees spent donning and doffing nonunique protective gear was “de minimis as a matter of law” and not
compensable.99 Tum v. Barber involved production workers in a poultry
plant who were required to wear numerous articles of protective gear.100
The First Circuit found that the employees’ donning and doffing was
integral and indispensable, but that all time spent donning and doffing
safety gear, and waiting and walking in association with donning and
doffing, was de minimis and not compensable.101
The principal question raised in both appellate cases was “whether
postdonning and predoffing walking time [was] specifically excluded by
[the PPA].”102 The Supreme Court held that
any activity that is “integral and indispensable” to a “principal
activity” is itself a “principal activity: under § 4(a) of the Portal-toPortal Act. Moreover, during a continuous workday, any walking
time that occurs after the beginning of the employee’s first principal
activity and before the end of the employee’s last principal activity
is excluded from the scope of that provision, and as a result is
covered by the FLSA.103
Thus, the Court ruled that the donning and doffing of safety gear
was a principal activity.104 This principal activity, the court held,
signaled the start and end of the workday, and time spent performing
activities, including walking or waiting, conducted between the start and

97

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 898 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 903(recognizing the integral and indispensable standard set forth in Steiner).
99 Id.; see also Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding a
distinction between unique and nonunique safety gear under Steiner’s integral and
indispensable standard).
100 Tum v. Barber, 360 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded sub nom. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
101 Id. at 279–81
102 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 30 (2005).
103 Id. at 37.
104 Id.; Perez v. Mountaire Farms Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 368 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Although
the parties in Alvarez did not challenge on appeal the conclusion that donning and doffing
protective gear was integral and indispensable to the principal activity of poultry
processing, it would be illogical to conclude that the Supreme Court would have held the
walking time to be compensable if it entertained serious doubts regarding the
compensability of the donning and doffing activities themselves.”).
98
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end of the workday must be compensated.105 Although the circuits below
found that, in some instances, time spent donning and doffing safety gear
is de minimis and not compensable,106 the Court held that these particular
instances of donning and doffing were still within the scope of “principal
activity,” as they signaled the start and end of the workday.107
ii. Circuit Law on the PPA
In applying the “integral and indispensable” standard set forth in
Steiner, the majority of circuits employ similar tests that reflect
Congress’s intent to construe work liberally under the PPA.108 In fact,
only one circuit, the Second Circuit, has construed Steiner narrowly.109
In the Ninth Circuit, an activity is integral and indispensable if it (1) is
necessary for the principal work performed, and (2) primarily benefits
the employer.110 Activities performed predominantly in the employees’
interest or for the employees’ own convenience are excluded.111 An act
is necessary to the principal work performed if it is required by law, the
employer, or by the nature of the work.112 The Ninth Circuit referred to
Section 790.8(c) of the DOL regulations, which interpret the PPA, when
explaining the test.113 Section 790.8(c) states that changing clothes is
integral and indispensable when “required by the law, by rules of the

105

IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 36–37, 40.
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2003) (“‘When the matter in
issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working
hours,’ the Supreme Court has observed, ‘such trifles may be disregarded[, for] [s]plitsecond absurdities are not justified by the actualities or working conditions or by the
policy of the [FLSA].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946))). But cf. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8 n.63 (1970) (noting that “[i]n a
colloquy between Senators McGrath and Cooper, 93 Cong. Rec. 2298, Senator Cooper
stated that ‘There was no definite purpose in using the words ‘30 minutes’ instead of 15
or 10 minutes or 5 minutes or any other number of minutes.’ In reply to questions, he
indicated that any amount of time spent in preparatory activities of the types referred to in
the examples would be regarded as a part of the employee’s principal activity and within
the compensable workday.”).
107 IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 37, 40.
108 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Perez,
650 F.3d 350; Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010); Bonilla v. Baker
Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2007); Ballaris v. Wacker Siltronic
Corp., 370 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2004); Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894; Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d
1123 (10th Cir. 1994); Dunlop v. City Electric, 527 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying
similar integral and indispensable test to different set of facts); see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.1
(1970).
109 Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d Cir. 2007).
110 See Perez, 650 F.3d 350; Ballaris, 370 F.3d 901; Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894.
111 Perez, 650 F.3d at 366; Dunlop, 527 F.2d at 398–99.
112 Perez, 650 F.3d at 366 (citation omitted).
113 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903.
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employer, or by the nature of the work.”114 The circuits that have applied
Steiner in the meat and poultry processing context have employed the
same or a similar test as the Ninth Circuit and have found that time spent
donning and doffing safety gear is integral and indispensable to the
principal work activity at issue and must be compensated if not de
minimis.115
As noted above, however, one circuit has applied Steiner
narrowly.116 The Second Circuit, in Gorman v. Consolidated Edison
Corp., concluded that Steiner applies only to measures necessary to enter
and work within a lethal working environment.117 Gorman involved
workers in a nuclear plant who claimed they should have been paid for
time spent complying with security procedures and donning and doffing
safety gear.118 The court examined dictionary definitions to determine
the meaning of “integral and indispensable,” finding indispensable to
mean “necessary” and integral to mean “essential to completeness.”119
The court provided an example of integral: “[A] diver’s donning of
wetsuit, oxygen tank and mouthpiece may be integral to the work even
though it is not the (underwater) task that the employer wishes done.”120
While the court found that the donning and doffing of safety gear may
have been indispensable, it concluded it was not integral to the principal
work activities, despite the fact that safety gear was required by the law
and the employer, because the employees did not work in a lethal
atmosphere.121
C. Section 203(o) of the FLSA
Section 203(o) is included within the definitions section of the
FLSA. It was added to the FLSA in 1949, two years after the PPA, to
114

29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970).
Perez, 650 F.3d 350; Franklin, 619 F.3d 604; Bonilla, 487 F.3d 1340; see also
Tum v. Barber, 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding donning and doffing of safety gear
integral and indispensable, but because the time was de minimis, the court did not order
compensation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez,
546 U.S. 21 (2005); Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894; Reich, 38 F.3d 1123.
116 Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d Cir. 2007). But cf.
Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202, 209 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Gorman in
concluding that donning and doffing the type of work clothing at issue—a postal
worker’s uniform, gloves, and work shoes—was not integral and indispensable to the
employee’s principal activities because it was not extensive and unique, but declining to
discuss the work environment).
117 Gorman, 488 F.3d at 593.
118 Id. at 589.
119 Id. at 592.
120 Id. at 593.
121 Id. at 593–94 (finding that Steiner applied to workers at a nuclear plant, but only
those who worked in the nuclear containment area).
115
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strengthen the PPA and avoid another set of lawsuits like those that had
led to the Act’s enactment.122 Section 203(o) defines hours worked,
permitting employers and union representatives to decide whether to
compensate time spent changing clothes and washing at the start and end
of the workday.123
Hours Worked.—In determining for the purposes of sections 206
and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed,
there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or
washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was
excluded from measured working time during the week involved by
the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide
collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular
employee.124
The original House Bill proposed that any activity could be
bargained away so long as it was part of a CBA.125 Senator Herter, who
introduced the amendment, used CBAs in the bakery industry to
exemplify what he hoped the amendment would allow.126 In the bakery
industry, there existed CBAs that provided that time spent changing
clothes at the end of the day would count as part of the workday; in other
CBAs, it was not considered part of the workday.127 Senator Herter
argued that, in both cases, the CBAs were “carefully threshed out
between the employer and the employee,” and “both [parties] [were]
completely satisfied.”128 The Conference Committee narrowed the scope
of Section 203(o) by limiting the exclusion to time employees spend
changing clothes and washing at the beginning and end of the workday,
and the final bill incorporated this limitation.129
Although the legislative history, the PPA, and the DOL regulations
provide some guidance as to how Section 203(o) should be interpreted,
122 Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 958 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 95 CONG.
REC. 11,433 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (comments of Rep. Herter).
123 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
124 Id.
125 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I (citing S. REP. NO. 81-640 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2241,
2255).
126 Id. (citing 95 CONG. REC. H11210 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (statement of Rep.
Herter)).
127 Id. (citing same).
128 Id. (citing same).
129 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op.
Letter
No.
FLSA2010-2
(June
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I (citation omitted).
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no United States Supreme Court decision has directly interpreted Section
203(o).130 As a result, there has been considerable disagreement among
the federal courts with respect to the interpretation of Section 203(o) and
similar inconsistencies within the DOL Opinion Letters.131 The main
issue to be addressed is whether “clothing” includes safety gear. A
second, but related, issue is whether Section 203(o) is an exemption
requiring narrow interpretation. Lastly, there is disagreement over what
constitutes a “custom or practice” under Section 203(o).
1. DOL Advisories Addressing Section 203(o)
The DOL, the administrative agency responsible for enacting
regulations and enforcing the FLSA, has issued several advisories on the
meaning of “clothes” within Section 203(o) and whether this includes
safety equipment.132 Since its first opinion letter in 1997, the DOL’s
position has changed multiple times, typically in conjunction with
political party changes in the executive branch.133 Due to the DOL’s
repeated position change, the federal circuits have not given deference to
the DOL’s interpretation nor are they required to.134
In 1997, the DOL considered whether donning and doffing safety
gear was covered by Section 203(o) and determined that, because
Section 203(o) “provides an exemption from the broad, remedial
provisions of the FLSA, it must be interpreted narrowly” and does not
apply to the donning and doffing of safety gear.135 It further explained
that the common usage of “clothing” refers to apparel and not safety
gear, “which is generally worn over such apparel and may be
130 See generally Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 131–32 (1994) (explaining that
Section 203(o) provides employees with minimum labor standards absent an agreement
to the contrary); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 741 n.19
(1981) (“Section [20]3(o) of the [PPA] . . . excludes from the definition of ‘hours
worked’ under §§ 6 and 7 of the FLSA, ‘any time spent in changing clothes or washing at
the beginning or end of each workday’ if that time was noncompensable ‘under a bona
fide collective-bargaining agreement.’”); Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956).
(“[I]ts clear implication is that clothes changing and washing, which are otherwise part of
the principal activity, may be expressly excluded from coverage by the agreement.”).
131 See infra notes 132–45, 146–50 and accompanying text.
132 Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 612–13 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing DOL
Opinion Letters); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK CH. 31 (Dec. 15, 2000); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Advisory
Memorandum
No.
2006-2
(May
31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/FieldBulletins/AdvisoryMemo2006_2.htm#.UKBXJoV-x7I.
133 Franklin, 619 F.3d at 612–14.
134 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987); Salazar v. Butterball,
LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 612–14.
135 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter, 1997 WL 998048, at *1 (Dec.
3, 1997).
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cumbersome in nature.”136 In 2001, the DOL restated this position in
another letter.137
In 2002, the DOL published another letter with a different
opinion.138 The letter declared that “changing clothes” within Section
203(o) applies to the donning and doffing of safety gear typically worn in
the meat packing industry.139 The letter explained that “clothing”
includes “items worn on the body for covering, protection, or sanitation,
but [does] not . . . include tools or other implements such as knives,
scabbards, or meat hooks.”140 The DOL restated this position in a 2007
opinion letter and further clarified that “clothing includes, among other
items, heavy protective safety equipment worn in the meat packing
industry such as mesh aprons, sleeves and gloves, plastic belly guards,
arm guards, and shin guards.” 141
In 2010, the DOL reverted back to the position it had taken in
1997 and 2001.142 It stated that dictionary definitions are not helpful
because they are a collection of a word’s various meanings and depend
on context.143 The DOL looked to the legislative history and found that
the “clothes” Congress had in mind when it narrowed Section 203(o)
were those that workers wore in the bakery industry and hardly
resembled the safety gear used in today’s meat and poultry industry.144
The DOL concluded that Section 203(o) does not cover safety gear that
is required by law, the employer, or by the nature of the job.145
2. Circuit Law Addressing Clothing within Section 203(o)
In light of the DOL’s lack of consistency, it should come as no
surprise that there is a circuit split over the meaning and interpretation of
“clothing” under Section 203(o).146 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
136

Id.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter, 2001 WL 58864, at *1 (Jan.
15, 2001).
138 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2002-2 (June 6,
2002), available at www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2002/2002_06_06_2_FLSA.pdf.
139 Id. at *1.
140 Id. at *3.
141 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2007-10 (May 14,
2007), available at www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05_14_10_FLSA.pdf.
142 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing
circuit split).
137
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Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that safety equipment
constitutes clothing” under the section.147 Yet, none of those circuits was
willing to declare a per se rule.148 Only the Ninth Circuit has found that
the donning and doffing of safety equipment does not “fit within
[20]3(o)’s ‘clothing’ term.”149 Similarly, the circuits are split over
whether Section 203(o) should be treated as an exemption and require a
narrow construction.150
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez involved
employees working at a beef processing plant, who were required to
wear extensive safety gear.151 The Ninth Circuit held that Section 203(o)
did not cover safety equipment.152 The court looked to the “ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning” of the relevant language because it
found inadequate guidance in case law and legislative history.153 The
Ninth Circuit first rejected the broad definition of “clothing” proposed by
IBP, Inc., explaining that FLSA exemptions “are to be construed
narrowly against the employer.”154
The court refused to apply
exemptions unless they “plainly and unmistakably” fit, and protective
gear did not “plainly and unmistakably” fit within Section 203(o)’s
“clothing” term, according to the court.155

147 Salazar, 644 F.3d 1130; Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010);
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); Sepulveda v. Allen
Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945
(11th Cir. 2007); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing
a dispute over law enforcement uniforms, not safety gear); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269
F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (determining that safety equipment worn while
manufacturing surgical needles and sutures constituted clothing).
148 See supra note 146.
149 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003); see also In re Cargill Meat
Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 379–80, 382–83 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(describing district court decisions coming down on both sides).
150 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1138 (discussing circuit split).
151 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005) (addressing whether post-donning and
pre-doffing walking time is excluded by the PPA; Section 203(o) was not at issue);
Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 898.
152 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905.
153 Id. at 904.
154 Id. at 905 (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)); see
also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 741 n.19 (1981)
(referring to Section 203(o) and other FLSA provisions as exceptions to the FLSA);
Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 751 (3d Cir. 1982) (interpreting Section 203(i)
narrowly); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 384;
Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1072–76 (D. Minn. 2007); U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter, 1997 WL 998048, at *1 (Dec. 3, 1997)
(classifying Section 203(o) as an exemption).
155 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905.
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Second, the Ninth Circuit explained that specialized protective
equipment is different than typical clothing.156 When feeling cold, one
does not consider putting on “a bullet-proof vest or an environmental
spacesuit. Rather, personal protective equipment generally refers to
materials worn by an individual to provide a barrier against exposure to
workplace hazards.”157 The court pointed to an Occupational Safety and
Health Administration regulation, which distinguished personal
protective equipment from general work clothes, and stated that general
work clothes are not intended to function as protection against workplace
hazards.158 Government-mandated personal protective equipment is not
an appropriate subject for collective bargaining because it would not be
in the interest of public policy to provide disincentives for use.159
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, in Sepulveda v. Allen
Family Foods, Inc., held that the meaning of “clothes” within Section
203(o) embraces safety equipment.160 Sepulveda involved employees at
a poultry processing plant, wearing what the court described as “standard
safety equipment.”161 Because the statute did not define “clothing,” the
Fourth Circuit looked to the dictionary to ascertain the plain meaning of
the word, which was defined as “covering for the human body or
garments in general: all the garments and accessories worn by a person at
any one time.”162 Since the statute referred to “clothes,” the court
determined that the most straightforward interpretation of the term
embraced all clothing, because even street clothes are worn for some
degree of protection.163 The court noted that Congress intended the
statute to encompass work clothes, and administrative regulations had
also referred to safety gear as clothing.164 The Fourth Circuit concluded
that all of the safety gear at issue fit within the definition.165 Other
circuits that have found safety equipment to fall within the definition of
“clothing” have either followed Sepulveda or adopted comparable
reasoning.166
156

Id.
Id.
158 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.130(b) (1999)).
159 Id. at 905 n.8.
160 Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 2009).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 214–16.
163 Id. at 215.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 216.
166 Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1138–41 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin v.
Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2010); Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc.,
614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 956 (11th Cir.
2007); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001).
157
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With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, federal appellate courts
that have addressed whether Section 203(o) should be treated as an
exemption—and, therefore, narrowly construed—have answered that
question in the negative.167 The Tenth Circuit, in Salazar v. Butterball,
LLC, involved workers at a turkey processing plant who were required to
wear various pieces of safety equipment.168 The Tenth Circuit explained
that the term “clothing” is ambiguous, pointing to the many, differing
interpretations of the circuit courts and the DOL.169 The court ultimately
found that Section 203(o) is not an exemption because (1) it was not
specifically designated as such by Congress; (2) it removes “discrete
activities” from the definition of hours worked, whereas other FLSA
exemptions remove entire classes of employees; and (3) it gives parties
the option of removing discrete activities through the process of
collective bargaining.170
The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have also held that
Section 203(o) is not an exemption, adopting reasoning similar to the
Tenth Circuit.171
3. Case Law Addressing Custom and Practice under Section
203(o)
Section 203(o) permits the exclusion of time based upon “the
express terms of or . . . custom or practice under a bona fide collectivebargaining agreement.”172 The majority of cases that reach the circuit
courts involve situations where the nonpayment of donning and doffing
is held to be a custom or practice under a CBA. The Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits do not require parties to negotiate or discuss
the compensation of time spent donning and doffing safety gear in order
to establish a custom or practice.173 A custom or practice can be
167 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1138; Franklin, 619 F.3d at 611–12; Allen v. McWane, Inc.,
593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2010); Anderson, 488 F.3d at 957. But cf. Adams v. United
States, 471 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that exclusions under the PPA
that are similar to Section 203 are not exemptions); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262
F.3d 222, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing Section 203(o) as an exclusion).
168 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134.
169 Id. at 1138.
170 Id.
171 Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that Section 203(o) is an exclusion but not an exemption and describing the PPA as an
exemption); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 611–12; Allen, 593 F.3d at 458; Anderson, 488 F.3d at
957–58.
172 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
173 Salazar, 644 F.3d 1130; Franklin, 619 F.3d at 617 (citing Allen, 593 F.3d at 457);
Anderson, 488 F.3d at 958–59; Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222, 226–27 (3d
Cir. 2001).
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established as long as there has been a prolonged period of acquiescence
and a CBA.174
Some district courts have interpreted custom or practice differently
than the circuit courts.175 These district courts require a prolonged period
of nonpayment during which employees knowingly acquiesce.176 The
reason these courts require more than a history of nonpayment is
because, otherwise, “[Section] 203(o) would essentially be an unlimited
FLSA exemption applicable to every unionized employer that did not
pay for clothes-changing time.” These courts do not believe that Section
203(o) is so sweeping.177
D. The FLSA, the NLRA, and Preemption
Adding to the confusion among the circuits is the additional
question of whether Section 203(o) and the NLRA preempt more
protective state laws.178 The FLSA explicitly grants states the authority
to create such laws,179 and all federal court decisions that have addressed
the issue have concluded that such laws are not preempted by Section
203(o).180 Nevertheless, some employers have asserted that Section
203(o) preempts state law.181 The more complex question, however, is
whether the NLRA preempts state laws that provide more protection than
Section 203(o). The issue of whether the NLRA can preempt a state law
that requires a shorter workweek in the context of Section 203(o) has
been addressed by several district courts and one circuit court.182

174

Franklin, 619 F.3d at 617.
See Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3,
2008); Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Minn. 2007); Fox v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., No. CV-99-BE-1612-M, 2002 WL 32987224, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2002),
overruled by Nos. 4:9–CV–1612–VEH, 4:06–CV–4676–VEH, 4:06–CV–4677–VEH,
2007 WL 6477624 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2007).
176 Franklin, 619 F.3d at 617 n.5.
177 Kassa, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
178 Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Cargill
Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Chavez v.
IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 WL 6304840 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005).
179 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1967).
180 See sources cited supra note 178.
181 Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 21.
182 Spoerle, 614 F.3d 427; Martinez v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., Nos.
8:09CV247, 4:09CV3079, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58457 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2011);
O’Keefe v. Hess Corp., No. 10-2598 (WJM), 2010 WL 3522088 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2010);
In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368; Townsend v. BC
Natural Chicken LLC, No. 06-4317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2,
2007).
175
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1. The FLSA and Preemption
i. The FLSA Savings Clause, Section 218
The FLSA contains a savings clause, 20 U.S.C. § 218, which
expressly permits states to promulgate more protective laws and establish
higher minimum wages and shorter maximum workweeks.183 Courts
have recognized that “[t]he intent of § 218(a) was to leave undisturbed
‘the traditional exercise of the states’ police powers with respect to
wages and hours more generous than the federal standards.’”184 The
purpose behind the FLSA, therefore, “is to establish a national floor
under which wage protections cannot drop, not to establish absolute
uniformity in minimum wage and overtime standards nationwide at
levels established in the FLSA.”185 The overall effect is to afford states
“a continuing role in regulating wages and hours (subject to federal
minimums).”186
ii. Circuit Law Addressing Section 203(o) and Preemption
In Spoerle v. Kraft, the first federal appellate decision addressing
the issue of preemption, the Seventh Circuit held that Section 203(o) did
not preempt a more protective Wisconsin state law.187 The employees in
Spoerle worked at a meat processing plant and were required to wear
several items of safety gear.188 The required donning and doffing of
safety gear took five to twelve minutes each day, and the CBA did not

183 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1967). Section 218(a) provides:
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with
any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher
than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week lower
than the maximum workweek established under this chapter . . . . [N]o provision of this
chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of
the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or justify any employer in increasing
hours of employment maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours
applicable under this chapter. Id.
184 In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
185 Id. (quoting Pacific Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1425 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
186 Dorris, supra note 5, at 1256.
187 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 430; see also Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1143
(10th Cir. 2011) (finding Colorado law, which had no statutory equivalent to Section
203(o), did not apply to the defendant and, therefore, declining to reach the issue of
preemption); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 393
(noting, in dicta, that Section 203(o) would not preempt state law); Chavez v. IBP, Inc.,
No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 WL 6304840, at *36 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005) (finding
that Section 203(o) does not preempt state law).
188 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 428.
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guarantee payment for this time.189 The employees wanted compensation
for these minutes at the higher rate of pay that was agreed upon during
bargaining.190 They argued that the safety gear at issue was not
“clothing” under Section 203(o) and that Wisconsin law did not have a
provision equivalent to Section 203(o) requiring payment for time spent
donning and doffing safety gear.191 Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning in Sepulveda, the court held that the safety gear constituted
“clothing” under Section 203(o) and subsequently sought to determine
whether Wisconsin law was preempted by Section 203(o).192
In concluding that Wisconsin law was not preempted, the Seventh
Circuit first pointed to the introduction of Section 203(o) and stated that
there was nothing in the section that limited the application of the FLSA
Savings Clause.193 “States are free to set higher hourly wages or shorter
periods before overtime pay comes due.”194 As an example, the court
cited a CBA providing payment of $8 per hour when the state minimum
wage was $8.25 per hour and the federal minimum wage was $7.25 per
hour.195 The court asserted that the more protective state law would
trump the CBA and require payment of $8.25 per hour. 196 Indeed, the
state law would trump both a CBA setting an hourly wage below the
minimum wage and one requiring a greater number of hours to be
worked in order to earn overtime pay.197
Despite the lack of case law supporting their position, practitioners
who represent management in labor and employment litigation have
asserted arguments in support of Section 203(o) preemption.198 These
practitioners rely on Sepulveda, a Fourth Circuit decision, which did not
address preemption but characterized Section 203(o) as a preference for
private resolution of specified workplace concerns.199 State law that
refuses to acknowledge Section 203(o) presents an obstacle to
accomplishing Congress’ purpose by preventing bargaining.200 Deferring
189 Id.; Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Wis. 2009);
Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
190 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 428.
191 Id.
192 Id. (citing Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 214–16 (4th Cir.
2009)).
193 Id. at 429.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 430.
196 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 430.
197 Id. at 429.
198 Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 21.
199 Id. at 873 & n.151 (citing Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209,
219 (4th Cir. 2009)).
200 Id. at 873.
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to the CBA, as opposed to strictly adhering to statutory mandate, is more
aligned with the spirit of the FLSA when it comes to protecting
workers.201 Section 203(o) is a unique provision allowing parties to
waive their rights under the FLSA through collective bargaining, and it
should not be taken away by state legislation.202
2. The NLRA and Preemption
i. The NLRA & the LMRA
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA to give employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively.203 Congress found that the denial of
these rights results in economic recession due to depressed wages,
decreased purchasing power, and the lack of adequate working
conditions.204 It also found that protecting employees’ rights to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce by preventing industrial
unrest and obstructions in the free flow of commerce.205 Furthermore,
permitting the formation of unions allows workers to compete fairly with
corporations, which are also collective entities.206
The NLRA was amended in 1947 by the LMRA.207 Section 301 of
the LMRA has been interpreted to require a common federal law for all
CBAs in order to maintain uniformity and consistency in their
interpretation and application.208 Thus, Section 301 preempts state law
claims requiring the interpretation or application of a CBA.209
In enacting the NLRA, however, Congress envisioned the
coexistence of federal labor laws and minimum state labor protections
for employees who bargain collectively.210 Determining whether the
NLRA preempts state labor laws involves a delicate balance between
maintaining uniform federal laws on collective bargaining and permitting
states to provide stronger labor protections for their citizens.211 There are
times when preemption may interfere with state laws that offer stronger
201

Id.
Id.
203 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
204 Id. § 151.
205 Id.
206 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
207 Id. § 141.
208 Id. § 185(a); Kirsten M. Nelson, Section 301 of the LMRA Does Not Require
Preemption of a Minimum State Labor Standard if the Legal Character of the Claim Is
Independent of the Rights in a Collective Bargaining Agreement: Livadas v. Bradshaw,
36 B.C. L. REV. 330, 331–32 (1995).
209 Nelson, supra note 208, at 332.
210 Id. at 331.
211 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947).
202
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labor protections.212 The Supreme Court has developed rules to deal with
this type of conflict.213
ii. The Supreme Court Addresses the LMRA
In Livadas v. Bradshaw, a California state law required the
provision of unpaid wages immediately upon an employee’s termination,
but the CBA at issue dictated otherwise.214 Thus, the employee in
Livadas was forced to choose between enforcing her state labor rights
and entering a CBA.215 The Supreme Court noted that “forcing
employees . . . to bargain for what they [are] otherwise . . . entitled to”
under state law is not part of federal labor law policy.216 It stated,
“[Section] 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights
conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.”217 To
survive preemption, the Court explained, “[t]he legal character of the
state . . . claim must be ‘independent’ of the rights under the collective
bargaining agreement . . . . [I]f the rights and duties asserted in the state
claim arise out of the contractual obligation of the collective bargaining
agreement, section 301 preempts the state claim.”218 When the meaning
of the contract is not the subject of dispute, states can consult CBAs to
resolve disputes without triggering preemption because the CBA may
have information helpful in determining damages in a state suit.219
iii. Circuit Law Addressing the LMRA
While a few district courts have addressed the issue, only one
federal circuit court has ruled on whether state law should be preempted
by the LMRA when Section 203(o) is involved.220 Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef,
212

Nelson, supra note 208, at 332.
Id. at 332–34.
214 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
215 Id. at 117.
216 Id. at 130.
217 Id. at 123 (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988);
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)).
218 Nelson, supra note 208, at 339; see also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123–24.
219 Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124; Nelson, supra note 208, at 339.
220 Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Martinez v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., Nos. 8:09CV247, 4:09CV3079, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 58457 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2011) (preemption); O’Keefe v. Hess Corp., No.
10-2598 (WJM), 2010 WL 3522088 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2010) (no preemption); In re Cargill
Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 392, 397 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(noting, in dicta, that the LMRA would preempt state law); Townsend v. BC Natural
Chicken LLC, No. 06-4317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2007)
(finding state law claims requiring compensation for donning and doffing were
preempted by the LMRA).
213
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Inc., the Seventh Circuit in Spoerle found that Wisconsin law was not
preempted because the law was not “interpreting or enforcing the
collective bargaining agreement.”221 The Seventh Circuit found that
nothing requires Wisconsin law to interpret or enforce the CBA.222 What
is required is that the CBA “be ignored, to the extent that it sets lower
wages or hours than state law specifies.”223 The court ignored a
provision in the CBA that did not require employees to be compensated
for donning and doffing safety gear.224 The court compared the situation
to a state law requiring a higher minimum wage than federal law
requires, and noted that a CBA paying the federal minimum wage would
have to give way to a state law requiring a higher minimum wage.225
The court recognized that every state law could affect collective
bargaining, because knowing that state law requires higher overtime may
lead labor and management to agree to a lower base pay.226
iv. District Court Law on the LMRA
Although there are only a few district court decisions addressing the
issue, they are split over whether the LMRA should preempt more
protective state laws concerning donning and doffing. O’Keefe v. Hess
Corp. followed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Spoerle and did not
find preemption, while the other district courts have concluded that the
LMRA preempts state law.227
In In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litigation,
employees of a meat processing plant filed several wage and hour claims,
including a claim for unpaid wages for time spent donning and doffing
safety gear. 228 Although the court found that the donning and doffing of
safety gear was compensable, as it did not find safety gear to constitute
“clothing,”229 it still analyzed whether Section 203(o) and the LMRA
221 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 430; see also infra Part IV(B)(2) (describing Lingle in further
detail).
222 Spoerle, 614 F.3d at 429–30.
223 Id. at 430.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 O’Keefe v. Hess Corp., No. 10-2598 (WJM), 2010 WL 3522088 (D.N.J. Sept. 1,
2010); see also Spoerle, 614 F.3d 427; Martinez v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., Nos.
8:09CV247, 4:09CV3079, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58457, at *51–53 (D. Neb. Apr. 12,
2011) (finding preemption and citing Seventh Circuit district court cases prior to Spoerle
that found LMRA preemption); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 368 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Townsend v. BC Natural Chicken LLC, No. 06-4317,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2007).
228 In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
229 Id. at 378.
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would preempt Pennsylvania law.230 Thus, in dicta, the court found that
Section 203(o) would not preempt the Pennsylvania law because the
FLSA explicitly permits states to enact laws mandating higher minimum
wages and/or shorter maximum workweeks.231 With respect to LMRA,
the court stated that state law would be preempted by the Act because it
would require interpretation of the CBA.232 Although there were no
express terms addressing the donning and doffing of safety equipment,
the court found that resolving state law claims would require an
interpretation of the implied terms of the CBA,233 which the court
determined were five minutes of compensation per day for mesh-wearing
employees and no compensation for non-mesh-wearing employees.234
In reaching its conclusion, the court cited a decision from the same
circuit, Townsend v. BC Natural Chicken LLC.235 In Townsend,
employees brought several wage and hour claims, including claims
involving the time spent donning and doffing protective gear.236 The
employees argued that their case was analogous to Livadas,237 and that
the court needed to look only to the CBA to offset the time the
The court found that
employees were already compensated.238
determining whether the time spent donning and doffing was
compensable required interpretation of the CBA, which expressly
provided “twelve (12) minutes of pay per week to provide for wash up
time,” and therefore, the state law claims were preempted.239
ANALYSIS
This article argues two points. The first is that Section 203(o)
should be construed narrowly to exclude safety gear and, therefore,
require compensation for donning and doffing. The second is that, even
if Section 203(o) is found to include safety gear, more protective state
laws, requiring compensation for donning and doffing, should not be
preempted by either Section 203(o) or the NLRA.
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Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
232 Id. at 392, 397.
233 Id. at 397.
234 In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
235 Townsend v. BC Natural Chicken LLC, No. 06-4317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2007).
236 Id. at *12.
237 See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text.
238 Townsend, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282, at *15.
239 Id. at *15–16.
231
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A. Section 203(o) Should Exclude “Required Safety Gear”240
1. “Required Safety Gear” is Defined in the DOL’s Regulations
and Used for Determining What Constitutes a Principal
Activity by the Federal Circuit Courts.
The DOL’s regulations should be followed in interpreting Section
203(o) for several reasons. First, the regulations not only are consistent
with the legislative intent of Congress, they also were approved by
Congress. Second, the majority of circuits already rely upon the
regulations to help define principal activities (i.e., work) under the PPA.
Lastly, employers will not face extraordinary liability because activities
that are de minimis do not require compensation.
Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Labor intended for the
phrase “principal activities” under the PPA to be construed broadly. On
the other hand, “preliminary” and “postliminary” activities under the
PPA were intended to be construed narrowly and not to be used as a tool
to avoid compensating employees. In accordance with these intentions,
the DOL’s regulations broadly define principal activities and specifically
mention Congress’s intent within their text. 241 Further, by enacting
Section 16(c), Congress approved of the regulations shortly after they
were issued by the Secretary of Labor, which suggests that the
interpretation was consistent with its intent.242
DOL regulations are enacted specifically to explain the PPA. The
regulations define principal activities as “activities which the employee
is ‘employed to perform’” and “all activities which are an integral part of
a principal activity.”243 There is no categorical list of “preliminary” and
“postliminary” activities except those mentioned in the PPA, and,
depending on the circumstances, an activity can be either principal or
preliminary.244 “[C]hecking in and out and waiting in line to do so,
changing clothes, washing up or showering, and waiting in line to

240 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970) (referring to “required safety gear” and
including items “required by law, by rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work,”
but not those worn primarily for the employee’s convenience); see also supra notes 108–
15 and accompanying text (describing test for “principal activity”).
241 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a)–(c) (1970); see also supra notes 108–15 and accompanying
text.
242 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
243 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a)–(b) (1970); see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) (1970) (“Among
the activities included as an integral part of a principal activity are those closely related
activities which are indispensable to its performance.”).
244 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(b) (1970).
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receive pay checks” may be preliminary or postliminary activities.245
Importantly, if the changing of clothes or washing is “required by law, by
rules of the employer, or by the nature of the work,” it is an integral and
indispensable part of the job.246 This language is consistent with the
legislative intent of Congress.
The majority of circuit courts look to the DOL regulations for
guidance in applying the PPA. In determining whether the time spent
donning and doffing safety gear requires compensation, almost all
circuits look to whether the activity is (1) necessary for the work and (2)
primarily benefits the employer. In applying the first part of this test,
circuits look to whether the activity is “required by the law, by rules of
the employer, or by the nature of the work.”247 The circuits cite to
Section 790.8(c) of the regulations for this language. Additionally, the
Secretary of Labor has relied on this language in its Advisory Opinions,
explaining that Section 203(o) does not include safety gear.
To produce a safe product for consumption, employees in the meat
and poultry processing industry are required—by the law, the nature of
the work, and their employers—to don and doff safety gear. The high
death and injury rates of workers on the job, as well as the illness and
death of workers and consumers from food contamination, clearly
demonstrate that the nature of the work requires multiple protective
measures.248
Employees are exposed to lethal chemicals that are
required for sanitation, lethal biological toxins from animals, hazardous
tools and machinery used to kill and dismantle large animals (or poultry),
and other hazardous working conditions created by continuous, repetitive
cutting motions in cramped workspaces at unsafe speeds.249 The
Occupational Safety and Health Standards, the Federal Meat Inspection
245 29 C.F.R § 790.7(g) (1970); see also 29 C.F.R § 790.7(h) (1970) (noting that when
employees are required by their employer to report to their workstations at a certain hour
and there is no work to perform for a period of time, waiting for work would be
compensable; however, if employees voluntarily arrive earlier than required, this is not
compensable); 29 C.F.R § 790.8(c) (1970) (“If an employee in a chemical plant . . .
cannot perform his principal activities without putting on certain clothes, changing
clothes on the employer’s premises at the beginning and end of the workday would be an
integral part of the employee’s principal activity. On the other hand, if changing clothes
is merely a convenience to the employee and not directly related to his principal
activities, it would be considered as a ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity rather than
a principal part of the activity.”); 29 C.F.R § 790.7(g) n.49 (1970) (“Washing up after
work, like the changing of clothes, may in certain situations be so directly related to the
specific work the employee is employed to perform that it would be regarded as an
integral part of the employee’s ‘principal activity’.”).
246 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970); 29 C.F.R § 790.7(g) n.49 (1970).
247 See supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
248 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2003); see supra notes 1, 33.
249 See supra note 10.
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Act, and the Poultry Products Inspection Act govern and require the use
of safety equipment and sanitary procedures within the meat and poultry
processing industry.250 When determining whether an activity is integral
and indispensable and thus work, the majority of circuits cite to these
federal regulatory schemes.251 Furthermore, state law regimes, industrial
groups, insurers, and individual employers have their own requirements
and policies, which courts also examine to determine whether an activity
is integral and indispensable and thus work.252
Courts assessing whether an article of clothing or safety gear fits
within the Section 203(o) exception are already familiar with the DOL’s
“required safety gear” standard, as it is already in common use. While
interpretation of “required safety gear” is not as clear as, for instance, a
bright-line rule stating that all safety gear constitutes “clothing” and
should be covered by Section 203(o), it better conforms with Congress’s
intent behind and interpretation of the PPA and provides adequate and
uniform guidance on which activities should be compensated.
Furthermore, even if the donning and doffing of safety gear is
found to be excluded from Section 203(o) because it is required by law,
courts should apply the de minimis test used in determining a “principal
activity” under the PPA.253 If time spent donning and doffing is de
minimis, the employer should not be required to compensate for it.
Although this interpretation would result in less coverage under Section
203(o) for employees who wear required safety gear, it would not
necessarily result in more liability for the employer.

250 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 (2011); 9 C.F.R. §§ 416.1–.6
(1996).
251 See Perez v. Mountaire Farms Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 366 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 9
C.F.R. § 416.5 (1999); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1994)); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619
F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010), 619 F.3d 604 (adopting language of sanitary conditions, but not
citing the USDA or OSHA statutes); Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903 (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1910.132(a) (1999); 9 C.F.R. § 308.3 (1999)). Cf. Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123, 1125
(10th Cir. 1994) (noting that regulatory requirements support integrality and
indispensability, but finding that donning and doffing required safety gear does not meet
the definition of “work” within the FLSA). But see Gorman v. Consolidated Edison
Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that an activity does not become
“integral” simply because it is required by the employer or a government regulation, but
does become “integral” when required for work in a lethal atmosphere).
252 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956); De Ascencio v. Tyson Food, Inc., 500
F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp.
2d 368 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Chavez v. IBP, Inc., No. CV-01-5093-RHW, 2005 WL
6304840, at *36 (E.D. Wash. May 16, 2005).
253 IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005).
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2. Section 203(o) Applies to Regular Work Clothing
There are significant practical and legal distinctions between
normal clothing and safety gear that prevent Section 203(o) from being
rendered meaningless when it is construed narrowly to exclude required
safety gear. Employees wearing normal clothing can still bargain over
whether time spent changing clothes and washing should be
compensated. But, because a meatpacker or poultry worker cannot
conduct his or her job without wearing safety gear, the donning and
doffing of safety gear is considered a principal activity and not merely
clothes-changing. Parties should be precluded from bargaining over
whether this time is compensated.
In Fox v. Tyson Food, Inc., the court discerned the practical
difference between clothing and safety gear. There, the district court
held that safety gear worn at a chicken plant could not be regarded as a
mere analog to clothing because the everyday, plain meaning of the term
“clothing” describes “what most people do every day—taking off
pajamas to put on work clothes in the morning, or taking off dress
clothes to put on casual wear in the evening.” 254 The court further
explained that a police officer’s uniform is different because it replaces
the clothing the officer wore before work, and a police officer can drive
to work in her uniform, whereas plant workers cannot be expected to
drive to work “wearing boots, arm guards, plastic aprons, and several
layers of gloves over their ordinary clothing.”255 The liberal and
remedial purposes of the FLSA suggest that Section 203(o) should be
construed to exclude activities that “clearly go beyond mere ‘clothes
changing’ and involve such unusual, extraordinary things as steel-mesh
gloves, plastic aprons, and soft and hard plastic sleeve guards.”256 These
items are not merely for the convenience of employees, but protect them
and consumers from death or serious harm.
As the Secretary of Labor noted in a 2010 Opinion Letter, the type
of clothing contemplated when Section 203(o) was enacted does not
resemble the kind or quantity of equipment used in today’s workforce.257
The example presented by Senator Herter, who introduced Section
203(o), involved clothing worn by bakers, not the complex, heavy, and

254 Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. CV-99-BE-1612-M, 2002 WL 32987224, at *6
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2002).
255 Id. at *7.
256 Id. at *6.
257 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I.
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cumbersome pieces of safety gear worn today.258 A plant manager at
Tyson Food, Inc. reported that each employee wears $400 worth of
safety equipment, and a plant guide at IBP, Inc. stated that a worker may
wear as much as $600 worth of safety equipment, including face masks,
hardhats, earplugs, cloth and steel mesh gloves, mail aprons and
leggings, weight-lifting belts, and shin guards. 259 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted “clothing” under Section 203(o) correctly by distinguishing
regular clothing from safety gear, which encompasses items worn to
protect against workplace hazards.260
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the PPA, and DOL regulations make
several legal distinctions between safety gear and clothing. The Supreme
Court, in Steiner, recognized the distinction between normal clotheschanging and items used for protection against workplace hazards.261
The Court recognized that it was not dealing with clothes changing and
washing under normal conditions, especially because the Government
had conceded that normal conditions would constitute either a
“preliminary” or “postliminary” activity.262 Within the federal circuits,
time spent donning and doffing regular clothing and standard uniforms,
such as police or postal worker uniforms, has not been considered a
principal activity under the PPA.263 Furthermore, the DOL regulations
acknowledge the distinction between these two types of activities.264
“[I]f changing clothes is merely a convenience to the employee and not
directly related to his principal activities, it would be considered . . . a
‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity rather than a principal part of the
activity.”265 Thus, the donning and doffing of safety gear is considered a
principal activity under the FLSA, and normal clothes-changing, which
is not integral and indispensable, can be subject to bargaining under
Section 203(o).

258 Id. (citing 95 CONG. REC. H11210 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (statement of Rep.
Herter)).
259 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 45; Meatpacking Injuries Spawn Union Drive:
Immigrant Workers at Tyson Plant Fight for “Justice, Dignity and Respect,” ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 18, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17158226/ns/businessretail/t/meatpacking-injuries-spawn-union-drive/#.UKKxuhy0ozI.
260 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
261 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 249 (1956).
262 Id.
263 See Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 2008) (postal worker
uniform); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (police officer
uniforms).
264 See 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) & n.65 (1970).
265 Id. § 790.8(c) (internal citations omitted).

72

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 9:35

3. CBAs Not Requiring Compensation for Donning and Doffing
of Required Safety Gear are in Conflict with the FLSA and the
PPA.
i. The PPA Requires Compensation, Regardless of Contract,
Custom, or Practice.
Section 203(o) allows time spent changing clothes and washing at
the beginning and end of each workday to be excluded from hours
worked through the process of collective bargaining.266 This provision
has created confusion among the courts because the donning and doffing
of clothing can be a principal, preliminary, or postliminary activity under
the FLSA, and because the meaning of “clothing” within the statute has
been interpreted differently.267 Yet, since the passage of the PPA, the
majority of circuit courts have construed “principal activity” broadly, as
intended by Congress, and found that the donning and doffing of safety
gear is work.268 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Steiner and IBP, Inc.
v. Alvarez provide strong support for the proposition that donning and
doffing required safety gear is a principal activity.269 Thus, it is largely
unanimous that the time spent donning and doffing required safety gear
is a principal activity, and, therefore, such time is compensable.270
Principal activities contribute to hours worked each day. 271 If
principal activities could be bargained away, such bargaining would
directly conflict with the FLSA, which prohibits employers from
lengthening the workweek.272 The FLSA Savings Clause permits both
federal and state law to set higher minimum wages and shorter periods of
time before overtime begins, but it does not allow employers to set lower
minimum wages or longer workweeks without overtime pay.273 The
FLSA Savings Clause provides that “[n]o provision of this chapter shall .
. . justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by
him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this

266

See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
See 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) (1970).
268 See sources cited supra note 108.
269 See supra notes 91–107 and accompanying text.
270 But cf. Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594–95 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that time spent donning and doffing protective gear is only a principle
activity when the gear is being used in a lethal atmosphere).
271 29 U.S.C. § 254(d) (1996); see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005)
(recognizing that some activities may start the workday, but time spent performing them
is not compensable because it is de minimis).
272 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (1967).
273 Id.
267
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chapter.”274 Therefore, CBAs that extend the maximum workweek, like
those excluding compensation for principal activities, directly conflict
with the FLSA and must yield to it.
Congress made clear that the PPA would compensate work
regardless of contract, custom, or practice and that principal activities
were meant to be broadly interpreted under the Act.275 Additionally,
Congress approved of the DOL’s regulations explaining the PPA and
articulating Congress’s intent.276 It is, therefore, unlikely that just two
years later, Congress would allow parties to bargain away principal
activities under Section 203(o), which amended the PPA. Congress,
after all, rejected the original House bill, which provided that any activity
could be bargained away.277 By limiting the scope of Section 203(o) to
clothes-changing at the beginning and end of each day, Congress
demonstrated that it was unwilling to allow parties to bargain over
activities that may be considered work. Senator Herter’s example of
bakers’ clothes-changing is more akin to regular work clothing, which is
not considered a principal activity by the courts today.278 Thus,
permitting collective bargaining over time spent performing activities
that are “preliminary” or “postliminary” under the PPA best comports
with the purposes and determinations of work under the FLSA.279
ii. Section 203(o) Is an Exemption that Should Be Construed
Narrowly
The Supreme Court is clear: exemptions under the FLSA “are to be
narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them . . . .”280
Exemptions are limited to those “plainly and unmistakably within their
274

Id.
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
277 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16,
2010) (citing 95 CONG. REC. H11210 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (statement of Rep.
Herter)),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I.
278 See Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 2008) (postal worker
uniform); Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 262 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2001) (police officer
uniforms).
279 See 29 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1996).
280 Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960); see also Holly Farms
Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 402 (1996); A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490,
493 (1945) (“Any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legislation must
therefore be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory
language and the intent of Congress. To extend an exemption to other than those plainly
and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and to
frustrate the announced will of the people.”).
275
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terms and spirit.”281 The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 203(f)
as an exemption and has referred to Section 203(o) as an exception.282
The Third Circuit has interpreted Section 203(i) as an exception, and the
Ninth Circuit has held that Section 203(o) is an exemption.283
Finding, however, that “clothing” encompasses safety equipment,
many circuits assert that Section 203(o) should be interpreted
expansively.284 These circuits reason that Congress did not expressly
designate Section 203(o) as an exemption, and the plain language of the
statute provides no indication of narrow interpretation.285 These circuits,
however, fail to consider how the PPA and its reinforcement, Section
203(o), fit within the FLSA. Both the PPA and Section 203(o) were
added to the FLSA with the express purpose of excluding certain
activities from the FLSA’s coverage.286 They are not included within
Section 213 of the FLSA because they do not fall within the same
category of exemptions.287 Section 213 exemptions exclude whole
categories of employees, whereas Section 203(o) and other FLSA
provisions exclude certain types of activities.288 The circuits’ arguments
also run counter to the legislative history of the PPA, which intended for
“principal activities” to be broadly interpreted and for “preliminary” and
“postliminary” activities to have limited application.289 Thus, Section
203(o) should be construed narrowly, which would limit its coverage to

281

Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392.
Holly Farms Corp., 517 U.S. at 402 n.8 (describing Section 203(f) as an
exemption); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 741 n.19
(1981) (“Section [20]3(o) of the [PPA] . . . excludes from the definition of ‘hours
worked’ under §§ 6 and 7 of the FLSA, ‘any time spent in changing clothes or washing at
the beginning or end of each workday’ if that time was noncompensable ‘under a bona
fide collective-bargaining agreement.’” (internal citations omitted)); Steiner v. Mitchell,
350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956) (“[I]ts clear implication is that clothes changing and washing,
which are otherwise a part of the principal activity, may be expressly excluded from
coverage by agreement.”).
283 See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003); Marshall v. Brunner,
668 F.2d 748, 751 (3d Cir. 1982) (describing Section 203(i) as the “ultimate consumer”
exception).
284 See supra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.
286 See 29 C.F.R. § 790.2(a) (1970) (“The effect on the Fair Labor Standards Act of
the various provisions of the Portal Act must necessarily be determined by viewing the
two acts as interrelated parts of the entire statutory scheme for the establishment of basic
fair labor standards. The [PPA] contemplates that employers will be relieved, in certain
circumstances, from liabilities or punishments to which they might otherwise be subject
under the [FLSA].”).
287 See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2004).
288 See id.
289 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
282
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activities which “clearly and unmistakably” fit within its purview.290
Under this narrow construction, “clothing” would not include safety
gear.
4. Requiring Compensation for Time Spent Donning and Doffing
Required Safety Gear Will Improve Working Conditions
The FLSA’s purpose is to address detrimental working conditions
by ensuring a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.291 As evidenced by the
numerous reports and lawsuits, current working conditions are
approaching the detrimental conditions that existed when the FLSA was
promulgated seventy-four years ago.292 With low levels of union
membership and an under-protective labor law regime, unions struggle to
effectively organize and make significant improvements to abusive
conditions in the industry. Even if a union was capable of forcing a few
employers to improve working conditions, these employers would not be
able to compete and would be driven out of business before the
remaining employers were unionized.293 Therefore, solutions that
improve baseline working conditions on a national- or industry-wide
scale are essential. Requiring employers to pay union employees for
time spent donning and doffing required safety gear is one step toward
improving the abusive work conditions in the meat and poultry
processing industry.
5. “Custom or Practice” Under Section 203(o) Codifies Industry
Custom
Meat and poultry processing employees have historically been paid
using a “gang time” model, meaning employees only get paid for time
actually spent processing poultry or meat on the production line.294
Thus, a history of nonpayment for donning and doffing is prevalent in
the industry. In enacting the FLSA and the PPA, Congress did not intend

290 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003); 29 C.F.R. § 790.2(a)
(1970) (“It would therefore appear that the Congress did not intend by the [PPA] to
change the general rule that the remedial provisions of the [FLSA] are to be given a
liberal interpretation and exemptions therefrom are to be narrowly construed and limited
to those who can meet the burden of showing that they come ‘plainly and unmistakably
within (the) terms and spirit’ of such an exemption.”).
291 See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
292 WHITTAKER, supra note 1, at 43.
293 See supra notes 57–58, 61 and accompanying text.
294 See Perez v. Mountaire Farms Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 360 (4th Cir. 2011); Sepulveda
v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2009); WHITTAKER, supra note
1, at 45.
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to perpetuate industry custom. 295 Rather, Congress intended for
employees to be paid for all work performed, including the time spent
donning and doffing safety gear.
While introducing Section 203(o), Senator Herter pointed to his
bakery example and noted that the issue under the CBA—payment
versus nonpayment of time spent changing clothes—was “carefully
threshed out between the employer and the employee . . . .”296 However,
where there have been no negotiations over payment of donning and
doffing time, there cannot be a careful threshing out of CBA terms.
Thus, a history of nonpayment alone cannot represent a careful threshing
out of the terms.
Nevertheless, the majority of circuits have found that a custom or
practice exists under Section 203(o) when there is a period of prolonged
acquiescence.297 The circuits’ interpretation of “custom or practice”
under Section 203(o) —one based purely on a history of nonpayment—
puts employers at an advantage and codifies industry custom. It does not
represent a careful threshing out of terms as Senator Herter
recommended when he introduced the section.
In determining the presence of custom or practice, a more just result
would occur if parties were required to show there had been negotiation
over the matter in dispute. Such negotiation would demonstrate that
actual bargaining had occurred and would not result in codification of
industry practice. The test used by some district courts is more in line
with congressional intent. These district courts require a prolonged
period of nonpayment and knowing acquiescence.298

295 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 741 (1981); see
supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
296 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Letter No. FLSA2010-2 (June 16,
2010) (citing 95 CONG. REC. H11210 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) (statement of Rep.
Herter)),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.htm#.UK
BVeIV-x7I.
297 See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
298 See Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3,
2008); Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Minn. 2007); Fox v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., No. CV-99-BE-1612-M, 2002 WL 32987224, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2002),
overruled by Nos. 4:9–CV–1612–VEH, 4:06–CV–4676–VEH, 4:06–CV–4677–VEH,
2007 WL 6477624 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2007).
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B. Section 203(o) and the LMRA Do Not Preempt State Laws
Requiring Compensation for Time Spent Donning and Doffing
1. Section 203(o) Does Not Preempt More Protective State Laws
The Savings Clause of the FLSA permits federal law, state law, and
municipal ordinances to establish a higher minimum wage or shorter
workweek than the FLSA requires.299 The Savings Clause also states
that no employer can interfere with any federal law, state law, or
municipal ordinance that, pursuant to the Savings Clause, has established
a higher minimum wage or shorter workweek.300 Since Section 203(o) is
part of the FLSA and is not limited by the Savings Clause, states may
define “hours worked” more broadly by requiring time spent donning
and doffing safety gear to be compensated, and employers cannot
compensate employees, union or non-union, below this level.
All federal court decisions discussing the issue, including a federal
appellate court decision, have concluded that Section 203(o) does not
preempt more protective state laws.301 The Seventh Circuit in Spoerle
found that Section 203(o) did not preempt a more protective Wisconsin
state law.302 The court observed that since a more protective state law
would trump the CBA with respect to minimum wage, a CBA calling for
a longer workweek than state law required would also be trumped.303
Practitioners arguing in favor of preemption often fail to discuss the
implication of the FLSA Savings Clause, which provides that the FLSA
creates a national floor for labor standards, not uniformity. This is a
significant flaw in practitioners’ analysis because the argument would
not necessarily end there. Even if Section 203(o) does not preempt state
law, state law may still be preempted by the LMRA.304 Further, as the
Seventh Circuit in Spoerle explained, the FLSA Savings Clause
explicitly allows states to promulgate laws shortening the workweek and
does not permit employers to oppose this.
299
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Practitioners also argue that deference to a CBA better conforms
with the FLSA’s purpose, which is to protect workers. But employees’
interests are not necessarily best protected by a CBA. Although union
workers may obtain more benefits than nonunion workers, unionization
is not necessarily the best means of providing baseline protection for
workers or improving work conditions, especially considering the current
number of challenges facing unions.305 Furthermore, bargaining over
compensation for time spent donning and doffing frequently does not
occur, and the circuits’ interpretation of Section 203(o) favors employers
under these circumstances.306 Broader measures, like the FLSA, which
provides a minimum level of protection, and more protective state laws,
which may provide a living wage,307 are more effective in protecting
workers, especially when enforcement of such laws is adequate.
2. The LMRA Does Not Preempt More Protective State Laws
State courts are not permitted to use state law to interpret CBAs;
however, states can set the level at which bargaining begins by
establishing a higher minimum wage or a shorter workweek.308 The
FLSA creates minimum labor standards for CBAs, and the Supreme
Court has found that a minimum wage and maximum workweek are
rights that cannot be waived by contract because doing so “would
‘nullify the purposes’ of the [FLSA] and thwart the legislative policies it
was designed to effectuate.”309 The Supreme Court has also found that
certain benefits required by state law, such as minimum mental health
benefits for employees with health insurance and severance pay, cannot
be bargained away.310 In Spoerle, the Seventh Circuit held that a
Wisconsin law requiring compensation for time spent donning and
Judge
doffing safety gear was not preempted by the LMRA.311
Easterbrook premised his decision on Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef, Inc., which had found that state laws disregarding, rather than
interpreting, CBAs were not preempted by federal labor policy.312
In Lingle, a unanimous Supreme Court held that “an application of
state law is preempted by [the LMRA] only if such application requires
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sufficient to feed, clothe, and shelter workers and their families).
308 See supra note 216–19, 183–86 and accompanying text.
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310 See Nelson, supra note 208, at 332–38.
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the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”313 In Lingle, an
employee was injured at work and filed an Illinois worker’s
compensation claim to cover her medical expenses; her employer
subsequently fired her for allegedly filing a false claim.314 Although the
CBA in question provided the employee with a broad contractual remedy
for wrongful discharge, the employee was permitted to bring a lawsuit
under a state law prohibiting retaliatory discharge.315 This was because
“the employee’s claim [was] based on rights arising out of a statute
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers.”316 Not every dispute involving a CBA provision will be
preempted.317 State law claims may require courts to look to a CBA to
determine appropriate damages, such as rate of pay and other benefits,
but this does not render the claim preempted.318
Only the Seventh Circuit has ruled on this issue with respect to
Section 203(o). Whereas all of the district courts that have ruled on the
issue agree with Spoerle that state laws are not preempted by Section
203(o), some district courts have found that the LMRA preempts state
laws requiring compensation for time spent donning and doffing safety
gear.319 Practitioners representing employers support these district court
decisions and have argued in favor of preemption.320 Accordingly, these
arguments will be addressed below.
i. District Court Decisions Finding Preemption Under the LMRA
Townsend’s reasoning for concluding that the LMRA preempts
state law is representative of other district courts that have likewise ruled
in favor of preemption.321 In making its decision, the Townsend court
first recognized that state law rights that do not exist independently of a
CBA, and can be waived or altered by agreement, are preempted.322 The
313
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court subsequently posited that interpretation is required to determine
whether a contract grants implied or express rights.323 The court stated
that “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent
upon analysis of the terms” of a CBA, that claim must be preempted.324
The court recognized that Lingle had held that a state law claim
addressing the same set of facts as a claim under the CBA was not
preempted because it did not require interpretation of the CBA.325 The
court also observed that, in Livadas, the Supreme Court had examined a
CBA in order to ascertain a wage rate necessary to resolve the plaintiff’s
state law claim.326 The court in Townsend, however, did not find the
facts of its case analogous to those in Livadas and, instead, cited two
Third Circuit decisions decided prior to Livadas, which had found that
employees were not entitled to back wages or overtime pay because the
CBA’s terms required interpretation.327
As discussed above, a state can provide minimum labor rights for
individual employees, whether or not those employees are covered by a
CBA.328 The FLSA specifically allows states to shorten the workweek
and increase the minimum wage. The Supreme Court has ruled that
courts can look to a CBA to resolve state law claims that are independent
of a CBA as well as matters covered by both state law and the CBA. The
meaning of the CBA, however, cannot be the subject of the dispute.329
Further, the Supreme Court has found that an employee should not be
forced to choose between a right guaranteed by state law and collective
bargaining.330
Townsend did not correctly apply Supreme Court precedent set
forth in Livadas or Lingle. There was no issue with respect to whether
the right in Townsend was independent from the CBA. Compensation
for time spent donning and doffing safety gear was required by
Pennsylvania state law and shortened the workweek, which is explicitly
permitted by the FLSA Savings Clause. This right was created by the
state and independent from any applicable CBA.
It appears that Townsend confused the calculation of damages with
interpretation of a CBA when it claimed that resolving the issue would
require CBA interpretation. Indeed, there was no dispute over the
meaning of the contract, which afforded employees twelve minutes per
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
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week for donning and doffing.331 The court needed only to look at the
CBA’s explicit terms in order to calculate the amount owed to employees
for time spent donning and doffing safety gear. No interpretation was
required, as the circumstances were no different than those in Livadas or
Lingle, where the Supreme Court had looked to the CBAs at issue to
calculate damages for violations of state law claims. The facts in
Townsend are also analogous to the scenario described in Spoerle, where
the Seventh Circuit looked to a CBA to calculate damages because,
under the contract, the employee was paid less than the state minimum
wage. Thus, the state law claim in Townsend should not have been
preempted, and the CBA should have been disregarded to the extent it
did not comply with state law. 332
iv. Practitioners Representing Employers
Practitioners representing employers have asserted that courts
should follow the reasoning set forth in In re Cargill Meat Solutions
Wage & Hour Litigation and Townsend.333 They argue that LMRA
“preemption occurs whenever the resolution of a claim requires a court to
interpret the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between an
employer and union-represented employees.”334 In addition, they assert
that “preemption is triggered when a claim is ‘founded directly on rights
created by collective-bargaining agreements.’”335 While recognizing that
the NLRA is not permitted “to preempt nonnegotiable rights conferred
on individual employees as a matter of state law,” employers argue that
the donning and doffing of safety gear is a negotiable right because
Congress left this type of compensation to be determined by collective
bargaining.336
Employers contend that their right to exclude
compensation for time spent donning and doffing is founded on a
congressional mandate, which is later manifested in the CBA.337 Section
203(o)’s language, according to employers, requires a court to look at the
CBA to understand its terms.338 Accordingly, the LMRA preempts state
law claims for donning and doffing under Section 203(o) because it
depends upon the interpretation of a CBA.339
331
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In response to practitioner contentions, states have been permitted
to provide minimal labor rights for individual employees, even those
employees covered by a CBA. Thus, CBAs must yield to both federal
and state laws that establish minimum standards such as minimum wage,
overtime, and other benefits that are independent from a CBA. States
that require compensation for time spent donning and doffing protective
equipment are exercising their right to establish a shorter maximum
workweek for employees—a right expressly granted by the FLSA
Savings Clause. As established in Livadas and Lingle, under these
circumstances, courts addressing overtime pay under state law are
permitted to look to the CBA in order to calculate damages without being
preempted.
CONCLUSION
In an extremely profitable industry, rife with abuse of workers and
debilitating working conditions,340 the costs of doing business should not
fall on the workers or communities where factories are located.341 When
workers are not compensated or not compensated fairly, society is left to
absorb the costs.342 Measures should be taken to ensure that the
corporations that create these abusive working conditions are held
responsible. Enforcement of all labor laws will undoubtedly improve
protection for workers, but, because of the egregious state of conditions,
more is required. Increasing employee protection under the FLSA,
which seeks to provide a minimum standard of living for workers, will
help provide employees with a living wage.343
A narrow construction of Section 203(o), requiring compensation
for the donning and doffing of safety gear, would result in improved
working conditions for all employees, achieving the FLSA’s purpose of
addressing detrimental working conditions through a minimum standard
of living.344 Such interpretation would not render Section 203(o)
meaningless because normal clothing would remain a subject of
340
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bargaining. Requiring employers to compensate employees for time
spent donning and doffing safety gear would also be more consistent
with Congress’s original objective, which was to have “work” construed
liberally under the PPA and for exemptions under the FLSA to be
construed narrowly. Furthermore, a clear and uniform interpretation of
Section 203(o) would result in less litigation for all parties involved.
Even if Section 203(o) is interpreted to include safety gear, the
FLSA Savings Clause permits states to enact more protective state laws
with regard to minimum wages, overtime pay, and other types of
employee benefits. State laws requiring compensation for donning and
doffing safety gear shorten the workweek and fall under the FLSA
Savings Clause. In addition, Supreme Court jurisprudence allows CBAs
to be ignored to the extent they do not conform with state laws that create
rights independent of a CBA. Looking to a CBA to determine damages
does not conflict with the LMRA. Therefore, state laws requiring
compensation for the donning and doffing of safety gear are independent
of CBAs and should not be preempted by the LMRA.

